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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. ( 
JACK YOUNGLOVE, ) 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought pursuant to the provi-
sious of Title 77, Chapter 60, Utah Code Annotated, 
Hl.53. for the purpose of securing a judicial determi-
nation that the defendant is the natural father of an 
illegitimate child. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the denial of de-
fendant's Motion for New Trial, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action arising out of a complaint signed 
by Betty Wallberg, pursuant to Section 77-60-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, accusing the defendant with 
being the father of her illegitimate child. The case was 
subsequently tried to a jury and from a verdict in favor 
of plaintiff, and the denial of defendant's Motion for 
New Trial, defendant appeals. 
The record herein establishes the following uncon-
troverted facts: 
At the time of trial, the defendant was serving a 
sentence in the Utah State Prison arising out of his 
conviction, on or about December 18, 1964, of the crime 
of burglary. 
The defendant first met Betty Wall berg at the 
Ute Bar in Salt Lake City, Utah, where she was em-
ployed as a bar maid, during the first week in January 
of 1964 (R. 34, 47 and 62). Thereafter, the defendant 
saw Betty Wallberg frequently at the Ute Bar, (R. 
72) and on six occasions on and before January 20, 
2 
19G4, the defendant gave Betty 'Vall berg, and Marie, 
the owuer of the Ute Bar, a ride home after the bar 
closed (R. 73 and 74). 
Betty 'Vall berg had her last menstrual period, 
prior to the birth of her child, commencing January 
'27, 1964 and ending February 1, 1964. This menstrual 
period was a "regular" one and was consistent with 
her established menstrual cycle of approximately thirty 
days ( R. 36) . No medical evidence was introduced hy 
the plaintiff at the trial whatsoever. The child was sub-
sequently born on November 12, 1964 (R. 39-40). 
During the course of the trial the defendant took 
the witness stand in his own behalf and testified that 
"I never seen Betty from January 20th until 
March-after .March 15, any place." (R. 66). 
on cross-examination, which counsel for the plaintiff 
asked the following questions to which the following 
answers were given and the following objections were 
made: 
"BY l\1R. 'VIND]'.R: 
Q 'Vhat is your present address, Mr. Young-
love? 
MR. lHARTINEAU: I object to that. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I think 
this is irrelevant and immaterial and an effort 
to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. 
I would object to it on that ground. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
3 
Q (Mr. Winder) Have you ever been convicted 
of a felony, Mr. Younglove? 
A Yes. 
Q What felony? 
A Burglary. 
Q Where? 
A Salt Lake. 
Q The date of your conviction? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I object 
to that as irrelevant and immaterial, the date 
of it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
MR. MARTINEAU: :May I have an excep-
tion, he is trying to get in through the back door 
through this line of questions what he was un-
able to elicit with the other question. 
THE COURT: 'Vhat is your answer? 
A Box 250, Draper, Utah. 
Mr. Winder: 
Q What is the date you were committed or sen-
tenced? 
A December 18, 1964." (R. 71-72). 
The record shows that further on in the trial the 
following testimony was given: 
"Q Did you give Mrs. 'Vallberg a ride borne? 
A Yes. 
Q On how many separate occasions do you 
think? 
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A Six times. 
Q ''T as the first of these on January 20th? 
A No, the last of them. 
THE COURT: What? 
THE \VITNESS: The last of them. 
Q (.Mr. "Tinder) "\Vhen was the first time? 
A The second night I knew her. 
Q \Vhat was your reason for giving Mrs. Wall-
berg a ride home? 
A YV ell, she didn't seem to have any way home. 
Q \Vas there any other reason? 
A No, sir. 
Q Did you have sexual intercourse with her on 
any of those nights? 
A I refuse to answer on the grounds it might 
incriminate and disgrace me. 
THE COURT: You have to answer it. 
l\IR. I\'IARTINEAU: I would object to 
that. I think he should limit the examination of 
the questions to the period of her gestation, and 
not-should not open it up to the prior period 
of January and clear through March. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
The Court requires you to answer that ques-
tion. 
A Yes. 
Q (Mr. \Vinder) Did you have intercourse on 
every occasion, J\fr. Younglove? 
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A Pardon? 
Q Did you on all six of those occasions? 
A Yes." (R.74-75). 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ-
UDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S COUNSEL, OVER OBJECTION, TO 
QUE S TI 0 N DEFENDANT REGARDING 
THE DETAILS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RE-
LATING TO DE:F'ENDANT'S PRIOR BURG-
LARY CONVICTION AND CONFINEMENT 
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro· , 
vides that: 
""A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his 
answer may establish a claim against himself; 
but he need not give an answer which will have 
a tendency to subject him to punishment for a 
felony; nor need he give an answer which will 
have a direct tendency to degrade his character, 
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact 
from which the fact in issue would be presumed. 
But a witness must answer as to the fact of his 
previous conviction of felony." 
Although it is clear under the foregoing pnwision 
that a witness must answer as to the fact of a previous 
felony conviction, it is equally clear under the decisions 
6 
of this Court that once the witness has answered as to 
the fact of his prior conviction, further inquiry regard-
ing his conviction is foreclosed. State v. Johnson, 76 
Gtah 8.J<, 287 P.909 (1930); State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 
llO P.434 ( 1910). 
The applicable rule is stated as follows in State 
l'. Vance, supra, 38 Utah at 37, no Pac. at 447. 
"Under our statute any witness, for the pur-
pose of affecting his credibility, may be asked 
whether or not he has previously been convicted 
of a felony. If he answers "yes," this ends the 
inquiry; and, if he answers "no," the record of 
his conviction is conclusive against him . . ." 
(Emphasis added). 
In State v . .Johnson, supra, 76 Utah at 95, 287 Pac. at 
913, the rule adopted in State v. Vance, supra, was 
again followed and reaffirmed as follows: 
"A witness, as affecting his credibility, may 
be asked if he had not previously been convicted 
of a felony ,and the kind or name of the felony, 
but not as to the details or circumstances of it." 
(Emphasis added). 
In the instant case the Court permitted plaintiff's 
counsel to question the defendant, over objection, re-
ganli11g the date of his conviction. This question was 
obviously irrelevant and immaterial and was no doubt 
intended to make the jury aware that the defendant 
was then being confined in the Utah State Prison. 
:.lore importantly, this question was outside the scope 
d c \ ·nni1wtion permitted by Section 78-24-9, and the 
tlcl i-,ions of this Court, quoted and cited hereinabove. 
7 
The action by the Court in requiring the defendant 
to answer the question regarding the date of his con-
viction was, for the reasons stated above, clearly erro-
neous and prejudicial to the defendant. The defendant 
is, therefore, entitled to be awarded a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ-
UDICIAL ERROR IN REQUIRING DEFEND-
ANT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, CONTRARY 
TO AND IN VIOLATION AND DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHTS AGAINST SELF IN-
CRIMINATION. 
The following uncontroverted facts are established 
by the record herein: 
1. The information filed herein alleges that Betty 
Wallberg became pregnant with the subject child on 
or about February 10, 1964 (R. 1). 
2. Betty Wallberg's last menstrual period, prior to 
the birth of her child, commenced on January 27, 1964 
and ended February 1, 1964 (R. 36). 
3. Betty Wallberg's last menstrual period, prior 
to the birth of the child, was a "regular" period an<l 
was consistent with her established menstrual cycle of 
approximately thirty days (R. 36). 
4. The child was born on November 12, 1964 weigh-
ing eight pounds six ounces ( R. 39-40) . 
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The foregoing facts clearly establish that Betty 
\{a!lberg conceived the child sometime after January 
'27, liHi± and that she could not have, and did not, con-
cci\"e the c.folcl prior to that date. A contrary conclusion 
cannot reasonably be drawn from these facts. 
:Following the presentation of the plaintiff's case 
the defendant took the witness stand in his own behalf 
and testified, among other things, that he did not see 
Betty lVallberg at any time during the period from 
January 20, 1964 to March 15, 1964 ( R. 66-67). No 
questions were asked the defendant on his direct exami-
nation regarding possible sexual relations between the 
defendant and Betty Wallberg prior to January 20, 
HlG±. On cross-examination, however, counsel for plain-
tiff asked the following questions to which the following 
answers were given and the following objections and 
rulings were made: 
"Q Did you have sexual intercourse with her on 
any ~f those nights [on or prior to January 
20, 1964}? 
A I refuse to answer on the grounds it might 
incriminate and disgrace me. 
THE COURT: You have to answer it. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I would object to 
that. I think he should limit the examination of 
the questions to the period of her gestation, and 
not-should not open it up to the prior period 
of January and clear through March. 
THE COURT: 0Yerruled. 




Q (Mr. Winder) Did you have intercourse 011 
every occasion, Mr. Younglove? 
A Pardon? 
Q Did you on all six of those occasions? 
A Yes." (R. 74-75). 
These questions by plaintiff's counsel were clearly 
improper and the defendant should not have been com-
pelled by the trial court to answer them because they 
were outside of the scope of the direct examination and 
they were irrelevant and immaterial, since the facts 
established by the record made it perfectly clear that 
Betty Wallberg could not have and did not conceive 
the child until sometime after January 27, 1964. 
More significantly, the action of the trial court in 
compelling the defendant to answer these questions, 
after the defendant had refused to answer on the ground 
that it might incriminate and degrade him and orer 
objection of counsel, violated and deprived the de· 
fendant of his rights against self-incrimination and 
self-degradation guaranteed to him by the :Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
of America, Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, Section 77-1-10, Utah Code An· 
notated, 1953, and Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Anno· 
tated, 1953. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitulinu 
of the United States of America provides in part :1 1 
follows: 
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"No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment, has recently held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each of the sepa-
rate States safeguard to the individual the rights af-
forded to him under the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. l, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (June 1964). The Fifth Amend-
ment provides in part as follows: 
"No person ... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " 
In holding that the federal privilege against self-
incrimination applies to State laws and proceedings, as 
well as federal, the United States Supreme Court in 
Malloy v. Ho,r;an, supra, 378 U.S. at 8, 84 S. Ct. at 
1493, stated the applicable rule as follows: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment secures against 
State invasion the same privilege that the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees against federal infringe-
ment - The right of a person to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered ex-
ercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty, 
as held in Twining, for such silence." (Emphasis 
added). 
'l'he pri,·ilege against self-incrimination guaran-
teed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies 
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not only in the case of a witness in a criminal proceed-
ing but also in the case of a witness in a civil proceed-
ing if the answer might tend to subject the witness tr; 
criminal liability. The applicable rule is stated as fol-
lows in the case of McCarthy v. Arndstein, 26G U.S. 
34, 40, 45 S. Ct. 16, 17 ( 1924) : 
"The government insists, broadly, that the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not apply in any civil proceeding. The 
contrary must be accepted as settled. The privi-
lege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature 
of the proceeding in which the testimony is 
sought or is to be used, It applies alike to civil 
and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer 
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility 
him who gives it." 
See also Murphy v. Water.front Com'n o.f New York 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964); Malloy 
v. Hogan, supra; Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 
148, 78 S. Ct. 622 (1958). 
A review of Section 76-53-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, makes it clear that the defendant roulr1 
not answn the questions which the trial court compelled 
him to answer without subjecting himself to possible 
criminal responsibility. 
Although, by taking the witness stand in his own 
behalf, the defendant may have waived the rights against 
self-incrimination guaranteed him by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments as to matters which he Jll:lY 
have testified to and opened upon direct examination 
he did not by taking the witness stand waive these rights 
12 
as to possible incriminating matters which were not the 
subject of his testimony on direct examination. Ems-
pack v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S. Ct. 687 
(1955); Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516 (1 Cir. 
1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 827; Isaacs 
v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (8 Cir. 1958); United 
States v. 'Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3 Cir. 1949); United 
States v. Hoag, 142 F. Supp. 667 (D.C.D.C. 1956). 
Moreover, it should be noted that every presumption 
must be indulged against the waiver of the right against 
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-
teenth amendments and a waiver of the privilege is not 
to be lightly inferred. Emspack v. United States, supra; 
Sherman v. I-Iamilton, supra; Isaacs v. United States, 
supra. 
The privilege applies to all incriminating matters 
which have not been opened up on direct examination, 
United States v. Toner, supra, and unless the facts 
which are testified to on direct examination are actually 
incriminating, the privilege cannot be held to have been 
waived. United States v. Hoag, supra, cites a large 
number of the cases which have passed upon the ques-
tion as to what constitutes a waiver of the right against 
self-incrimination. The general rule followed in these 
cases is then summarized as follows: 
"The rule of law, therefore, as announced by 
these cases, is that the voluntary answer must 
be 'criminating' to prevent the witness from 
stopping short and refusing further explana-
tion. The defendant in this case did not testfiy 
as to any criminating fact; on the contrary her 
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testimony relied on by the Government as re-
quiring her to answer the questions herein ill-
volved were completely non-criminating in char-
acter and under the authorities above mentioned 
she had the right to 'stop short' and assert he;. 
privilege." 
The defendant in the instant case did not testify 
on direct examination as to any criminating fact, nor 
any other facts, relating to any sexual relations with 
Betty Wall berg prior to January 27, 1964. Accord-
ingly, the defendant did not waive his rights against 
self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, as to possible criminating facts 
relating to the period on or prior to January 20, 196l 
In addition to the rights against self-incriminatiou 
guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution. 
the defendant also has such rights guaranteed to him 
by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah a~ by Sections 77-1-10 and 78-2.J.-9. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Article I, Section 12 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides in 
part: 
"The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself " 
Section 77 -1-10 provides: 
"The accused shall not be compelled to qitc 
evidence ar;ainst himself . . ,, (Emphasis a<ldcd). 
Section 78-24-9 proYides further that: 
"A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, although !us 
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answer may establish a claim against himself; 
but he need not give an answer which will have 
a tendency to subject him to punishment for a 
felony; nor need he give an answer which will 
have a direct tendency to degrade his character 
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact 
from which the fact in issue would be presumed. 
But a witness must answer as to the fact of his 
previous conviction of a felony." (Emphasis 
added). 
As in the case of the federally guaranteed right 
against self-incrimination, the protection applies in civil 
as well as in criminal proceedings. As was stated by 
this Court in the case of State v. Byington, 114 Utah 
388, 391, 200 p .2d 723, 724 ( 1948) : 
"It is generally recognized that the privilege 
against self-incrimination provided for in those 
constitutional provisions [Fifth Amendment to 
Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution] protects a wit-
ness as well as a party accused of crime in a 
civil as well as in a criminal action from being 
required to give testimony which tends to incrimi-
nate him. It is further generally recognized that 
any fact which is 'a necessary or essential part 
of a crime' if testified to by a witness would tend 
to incriminate him." 
The question as to what testimony by a witness 
on <lirect examination will act as a waiver of his state 
girnranteed right against self-incrimination and self-
tkgradation has been considered by this Court pre-
Y!ously. Slate ~'. Shocldey, 29 Utah 25, 80 Pac. 865 
( 1905) ; State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 
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( 1910) ; State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208 117 Pac .. 58 
( 1911) ; State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270 
(1913); Sadleir v. Youny, 97 Utah 291, 85 Pac. 2d 
810 ( 1938) ; State v. B/jington, 114 Utah 388, 200 Pac. 
2d 723 (1948). 
In the case of State v. Vance, supra, 38 Utah 
at 32-33, 110 Pac. at 445, the defendant who was 
being prosecuted for murder was cross-examined by 
the prosecution, over objection, regarding certain con-
versations and facts ·which the defendant had not 
testified to on his direct examination. In holding 
that such cross-examination was improper this Coml 
stated: 
"The rule is that as to whether the accused 
has made certain admissions, or his made state· 
ments of material. facts against himself, and 1 
everything which may contradict, morlify, ex· 
plain, or make clearer, limit, or enlarge the mean-
ing of the statements made by him while testify· 
ing with respect to any subject of which he has 
testified, may be inquired into on cross-exami· 
nation. The inquiry must, however, be limited 
to the subject-matters gone into by the witness 
in his testimony in chief ... Where the accused. 
as a witness, denies that he committed or was 
connected with the commission of the criminal act 
or acts constituting the offense for which he is 
being tried, the cross-examination ordinarily 
must be permitted to extend to the whole range 
of facts which in some way relate to the trans· 
action constituting the offense. But u•herc. ns 
in the case at bar, the witness limits his state: 
1nents to negativing or explaining mere isohitcd 
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facts, or merely states what occurred at a par-
ticular time and place, then what took pfope 
at such time and place ordinarily constitutes the 
subject matter upon which the witness testified, 
and the cross-examination should be limited to 
that suhject .... [W]e cannot see upon what 
theory the court's r-ulings can be sustained by 
which appellant was required to answer the 
questions relating to the conversations and state-
ments that were inquired into respecting the 
beating and bruising and deceased's condition 
attributable thereto. Appellant had neither di-
rectly nor indirectly denied, nor in any way nega-
tived his connection with the beating. He left 
the subject untouched in his examination in 
chief. The subject, therefore, was not opened 
up for cross-examination." 
In the case of State v. Thorne, supra, 39 Utah 
at 223-24, 117 Pac. at 63, the defendant testi-
fied on his own behalf regarding certain occurrences 
which he had participated in on the date of the robbery 
for which he was being tried. He was then asked, on 
cross-examination, about the facts relating to his acqui-
sition of the gun used in the robbery. This Court held 
such cross-examination improper in the following lan-
guage: 
"'Vhen a question is asked which relates to 
incriminating acts, or calls for evidence of an 
incriminating character, separate and distinct 
from those on trial or testified to by him, he, like 
auy other witness, may claim the privilege and 
decline to answer it." 
In the case of Sadlier v. Young, supra, the defendant 
was being prosecuted for carnal knowledge of a minor. 
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The complaint under which the defendant was being 
prosecuted alleged that the offense had taken place on 
July 27, 1938. During the course of the trial the minor 
was called as a witness and asked whether or not she ha<l 
had any sexual intercourse with the defendant betweeu 
July 4, 1938 and July 27, 1938. The Court then re-
quired the witness to answer this question over objection 
of counsel. In commenting upon this ruling, this Court 
held as fallows: 
"The record discloses that when the question 
was asked to which claim of privilege was made, 
counsel for the defendant Kaddas interposed the 
general objection of immateriality, incompe-
tency and irrelevancy. As the evidence of the 
case then stood that objection should have been 
sustained. Had such ruling been made, the neces-
sity of claiming privilege would not have arisen 
on the part of applicant for this writ .... The 
danger of permitting such situation going to a 
jury is that a defendant may be found guilty 
of an offense similar in character upon a differ-
ent date, but not charged, or, if charged, ex-
cluded by the election the law makes upon the 
introduction of testimony as to the act proposed ' 
to be proved." 
* * * * 
"This bring us to the remaining provision of 
the statute to the effect that a witness 'need not 
give an answer * * * which will have a direcl 
tendency to degrade his character, unless it. i1 
to the verv fact in issue or to a fact from 1.rhll'\i 
the fact i~ issue would be presumed.' The infor-
mation sought to be elicited by the question wa' 
not the fact in issue. The witness had testifietl 
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negatively as to the fact in issue sought .t? be 
established. 'Vas the fact sought to be ehc1ted, 
to wit, an act of sexual intercourse prior to the 
time alleged in the information and as to which 
the state had elected to be bound, such fact that 
from it the very fact in issue would be presumed? 
'Ve think this question must be answered in the 
negative .... " Id, 97 Utah at 291-98, 85 Pac. 
2d 811-13. 
See also State v. Cro"tXder, 119 Wash. 450, 205 
Pac. 850 (1922); State v. LaMont, 23 S.D. 174, 120 
N.W. 1104 (1909). 
It is clear from a review of the decisions cited above 
that the defendant in the instant case could not properly 
be compelled to answer the questions regarding his 
possible sexual relations with Betty Wallberg on or 
prior to January 20, 1964. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in compelling the defendant to answer these ques-
tions. And such error was obviously and patently preju-
dicial to the defendant in this case. Joseph v. W. H. 
Groves, Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 
P.2d 330 (1957); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 
237 P.2d 834 ( 1951). As was stated by this Court in 
Jnseph v. W. JI. Grove, Latter Day Saints Hospital, 
supra, 7 Utah 2d at 44, 318 P.2d at 333. 
"It is not always easy to tell wheu an error 
should be regarded as prejudicial, as attested by 
the division of the court in this case. It is neces-
sary to survey all of the facts and circumstances 
disclosed by the record and if, in so doing, the 
error appears to be of such a nature that it can 
be said with assurance that it was of no material 
cm15equenee in its effect upon the trial because 
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reasonable minds would have arrived at the same 
result, regardless of such error, it would be ' 
harmless and the granting of a new trial would 
not be warranted. On the other hand, if it ap-
pears to be of sufficient moment that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such 
error a different result would have eventuated, 
the error should be regarded as prejudicial and 
relief should be granted." 
In the instant case the answers which the defendant was 
erroneously compelled to give, when considered by the 
jury in connection with the most critical issue before 
them, namely whether or not the defendant had sexual 
relations with Betty "\Vallberg after January 27, 1965 
which caused her to conceive the child, were ohriously 
"of sufficient moment that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that in absence of such error a different result 
would have eventuated." 
Of course, the prejudicial effect of the trial court's 
violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory 
rights against self-incrimination does not exist alone 
in the unfair and adverse impact that the improper 
compulsory testimony must have had on the jury's 
opinion ~{ the defendant's character. The essential 
prejudice resulting from violation of the right against 
self-incrimination has been stated on many occasions 
to be the exposure to criminal prosecution. McCarthy 
v. Arndstein, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant the 
defendant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
Suite 300, 141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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